A lecture delivered at the “Constituent Power” seminar, Prof. Nenad Dimitrijevic,
CEU, PolSci Department
February 6, 2014
In this lecture I draw a comparison between the way Rousseau addresses the so-called "constitutional beginning problem" ("How can a multitude of strangers meet, deliberate and rationally agree a constitution for the common good? For this to happen, “the effect would have to become the cause – humans would have to be beforehand that, which they can only become as a consequence of the foundational act” (Social Contract, p.71); ) and how Carl Schmitt addresses the closely related problem of "constituent power" of the people as an existential unity preceding the formation of the constitution.
I then identify a "paradox of constitutional beginning/constituent power" of which both Rousseau and Schmitt were acutely aware: How can “the people” act as a “constituent power” to establish the form of the political union (give itself a Constitution), if they can be identified as such a "political union" only by virtue of that very pact? I.e. Constituent power not only involves the exercise of power by the people, but it simultaneously constitutes a people.
I explore the way both Rousseau and Schmitt tackle the paradox. I find their illiberal solutions to this paradox deeply ambiguous and dissatisfying.
Rousseau does not provide sufficient constitutional safeguards to prevent the Sovereign from disintegrating into a mere aggregate of individuals, often relying on purely coercive instruments (liable to abuse by angry majorities) for guaranteeing the cohesion of the political community.
Schmitt's answer is even less satisfactory: his solution is to transfer the constituent power of the Sovereign from the passive people to the Reichspraesident, giving him wide decisionist prerogatives - backed by his unconstrained "emergency powers" in the Weimar Constitution.
CEU, PolSci Department
February 6, 2014
In this lecture I draw a comparison between the way Rousseau addresses the so-called "constitutional beginning problem" ("How can a multitude of strangers meet, deliberate and rationally agree a constitution for the common good? For this to happen, “the effect would have to become the cause – humans would have to be beforehand that, which they can only become as a consequence of the foundational act” (Social Contract, p.71); ) and how Carl Schmitt addresses the closely related problem of "constituent power" of the people as an existential unity preceding the formation of the constitution.
I then identify a "paradox of constitutional beginning/constituent power" of which both Rousseau and Schmitt were acutely aware: How can “the people” act as a “constituent power” to establish the form of the political union (give itself a Constitution), if they can be identified as such a "political union" only by virtue of that very pact? I.e. Constituent power not only involves the exercise of power by the people, but it simultaneously constitutes a people.
I explore the way both Rousseau and Schmitt tackle the paradox. I find their illiberal solutions to this paradox deeply ambiguous and dissatisfying.
Rousseau does not provide sufficient constitutional safeguards to prevent the Sovereign from disintegrating into a mere aggregate of individuals, often relying on purely coercive instruments (liable to abuse by angry majorities) for guaranteeing the cohesion of the political community.
Schmitt's answer is even less satisfactory: his solution is to transfer the constituent power of the Sovereign from the passive people to the Reichspraesident, giving him wide decisionist prerogatives - backed by his unconstrained "emergency powers" in the Weimar Constitution.
