Is the liberal order dying?

My short contribution to the conference

"The end of the liberal order?"at New Bulgarian University, 

6 June 2017, Sofia 

I will address two questions:

1. Is the liberal order, i.e. liberal democracy as the dominant political regime in the contemporary world really dying?

2. Who is to blame for its decline?

1.   Is liberal democracy really dying?      

No immediate danger of extinction. Rather, the danger is of gradual subversion, of malignant mimicry – due to reinterpretations of its core values and principles – that of moral individualism

The news of liberal order’s death is a gross overstatement (or fake news, if you prefer).

Though certainly in crisis, liberal democracy is not in immediate danger of extinction – not in the CEE region, at least.

Neither the ruling elites nor the electorate are ready to altogether abandon it.

Popular support in the region for the EU, if recently declining, remains high. And EU is still largely believed to come packaged with liberal democratic values and principles.  Thus it is not so much the external pressure – the danger of invoking art. 7 of Lisbon Treaty, but the internal unpopularity of questioning adherence to the EU and its core liberal-democratic principles, which partly accounts for this reluctance to openly abandon it.

To demonstrate the dangers of openly questioning some of these principles, it suffices to mention just one recent case –

“democracy has  taken a lot away from us”, Kornelia Ninova said, and this phrase

 the lapsus of the leader of the socialists in Bulgaria -  almost certainly costed the socialists the electoral victory in March 2017 snap elections. The critics now know that they have to pay at least a lip service to the principles of democracy, if not to “liberalism” per se.

I will open a bracket here –

There is a growing confusion in Bulgaria, but not only here, about what the liberal order is - does it simply denote the dominance of liberal democracy as a preferred political regime comprising various components (popular rule limited by respect for individual rights, limited government and rule of law, and competitive market) or is it also the dominance of liberalism as a specific ideology, as a doctrine? It has recently become a commonplace, almost a mainstream attack on liberalism to criticize its “exaggerated” concern with liberal individual and minority rights. Yet those critics rarely dare go all the way to challenging the core principles of liberal democracy such as popular rule with limited government and rule of law – which ultimately serve the interests and indeed - the rights of the every individual citizen.

This shows, I think, that here is still a wide post-transition consensus on the direction taken – we are all liberal democracies now and will likely remain such.

Yet what we witness today is a process of re-interpreting the fundamental principles of liberal democracy - a reinterpretation that risks subverting its rationale, its underlying values. 

I would argue that this process of re-interpretation has started much earlier – it is not just a post-transition phenomenon. This reinterpretation, I would argue, is partly responsible for the crisis of liberal democracy we are witnessing now.

This reinterpretation is (at least) a two-step process, which has been going on for some time now

1.            Already during the transition there have been considerable misreadings of the principles. These misreadings may be due

a.            to the lack of an alternative (may be it was perceived as a “forced” choice), or,

b.            to the swift adoption of new institutions without the necessary time for developing the useful conventions – the right ethos – needed to sustain them and make them capable of truly realizing the principles they were built to implement.

2.            Whatever the explanation for these misreadings  a.they have often been unintentional, b.     even the result of well-intentioned efforts to fill the empty shell of institutions with context-specific content,

3.            these misreadings are today made worse by a second wave of reinterpretations (neither neutralizing nor correcting the initial misunderstanding). What we witness today, however, is not always well-intentioned, and, surely, is a much less benign confusion.  Post-transition national elites that displaced the much hated transition elites often intentionally, fully self-consciously reinterpret the principles with the aim of serving their purposes – clinging to power at all costs – which means - ultimately subverting them (as they limit their power).

4.            The end result is not even empty shell institutions – but a threatening mimicry. A mimicry , produced by the opportunistic post-transition elites.

The post-transition elites act much like free-riders,  capitalizing on the sacrifices of the transition elites on whose backs they climbed to power.

What are the substantive reinterpretations of the fundamental principle of liberal democracy that may partly explain its current crisis?

Take the  fundamental principle of liberal democracy - equal rights and freedoms for all members  of the democratic community. This is the ideal of liberal equality, which requires equal respect for the freedom and autonomy of each citizen. It is well captured by the slogan  “Everyone counts and counts equally.” In this principle  the individual is at the centre of the moral universe. Ronald Dworkin called this normative idea “moral individualism”

This normative idea behind liberal democracy was, at the first step of misunderstanding, interpreted as “radical individualism”.  The vision of a democratic community we were presented with during the transition was that  of self-standing individuals, owing their success only to themselves, owing nothing to nobody else. This distorted vision of democratic community is far removed from the genuine normative ideal of “moral individualism”, which demands a moral community of equals to cherish and advance it.  Its misinterpretation as radical individualism, on the contrary, destroys any community.

Understandably, there has been a justified popular dissatisfaction with this radical reinterpretation of individualism. Yet the form this dissatisfaction took was not, as one would expect - of going back to the original aspirations behind “moral individualism”  - i.e. to the aspiration for equal rights and fair equality of opportunity for all.

Rather, there was a further transformation, re-interpretation of this ideal – and this is the second step in its reinterpretation already in the post-transition period.  Now we are told that equality of rights and freedoms is, at best, a relationship that holds within the majority, within the presumably homogeneous core of the nation, and does not include those we do not like, those we perceive as different, those we perceive as “other”, those with whom we disagree. The vision is that of community of unequals – with a core, majority enjoying privileges, which it is ready to defend with majoritarian means against the outsiders – be it dissenting individuals or disliked minorities..

It is in line with this second reinterpretation that one can understand why some (right-wing, avowedly pro-EU) political parties in Bulgaria openly argued for the introduction of a de facto literacy test for the exercise of political rights (this was their explicit justification for the introduction of exclusive machine voting in parliamentary elections. The aim was, of course, to exclude the Roma as they  are “corrupting our democracy by selling their votes”)

To conclude: the normative ideal behind liberal democratic institutions – the moral equality of individual members of the democratic community, which justifies putting breaks on the popular will of majorities, is currently being  transformed into an opportunity for those majorities to retain their higher status and privileges against what they perceive as adverse developments and threats to those privileges.

2. Who is to blame for its decline? Meritocratic elites and the ideal of fair equality of opportunity

The misinterpretation of the principles of liberal democracy I outlined here is only partly responsible for the crisis this political regime is currently undergoing. The misinterpretation did not fall from heaven, however, but was given by the governing elites – both transition and post-transition ones.

The current crisis of liberal democracy is often described as the rise of populism , which is defined, among other things, as a revolt of the people (bearers of true sovereignty) against the corrupt elites.

Let be clear about one thing – what we witness today is not a revolt of the sovereign against the elites, but  an orchestrated by an aspiring new elite revolt against the old elites they want to displace. The success of the newcomers depends on how attractive is their new vision of a relationship between the elite and the people and whether it is seen by the people as more attractive than the outgoing alternative. 

The populist revolt epitomizing the current crisis, we are told, is a revolt against a particular types of elite, characteristic of liberal representative democracies – the meritocratic elite.  Indeed, some authors (Nancy Fraser, Ivan Krastev, Stehen Holmes) describe the  current global crisis of liberal democracy as a crisis of meritocratic elites, of meritocracy as the model of liberal democracy under late capitalism.

Not a fully satisfactory account of what is happening in CEE: the elites that pushed through the transition agenda were often not meritocratic, as indeed they did not emerge as victorious – did not win the right to rule - under fair competition terms. 

 Even in developed, consolidated democracies popular representation through meritocratic elites was never a fully realized aspiration. Why so?   simply because in no country the underlying premise of a true meritocracy – fair equality of opportunity – is fully met.

But this is not the only trouble with it, we are told by its critics – even if fair equality of opportunity would be guaranteed, meritocracy may still be in trouble – simply because the average citizen rarely identifies with a representative of such elites, even if they emerged under fair competition rules.

Not surprisingly, the elites that took over in the post-crisis period are media savvy personalities with whom the average citizen more readily identifies herself.

The defining feature of post-transition national elites (that displaced the elites, responsible for the transitional institution-building) is not merit, but belonging – they are claiming to have a quasi -“natural” right to  represent the people – as they are uniquely qualified to express the authentic concerns and interests of the respective nations.

The question is why  is this view of national quasi-tribal elites currently appealing and what has contributed to the discreditation of the meritocratic elites?

Meritocracy is both ex ante (most fair – based solely on personal achievements) and ex post (producing best results – best qualified rulers)  the best way to recruit elites in a representative democracy.

The two premises – fair equality of opportunity and success based  solely on personal achievement, however, may account for its current troubles

Both the psychological profile of meritocrats – highly individualistic, arrogant, self-made and self-reliant, opportunistic “mercenaries” with no loyalty to any community, and the fact that losing in fair competition makes the loser more not less miserable (he is only to blame for his failings) are responsible for the growing distance between such elites and their communities.

But what is the alternative?

The alternative - non-meritocratic, tribal elites, however, seem worse. They promise closing the competition for outsiders without guaranteeing it will be fair  or open for the insiders (Trump). The bitter losers may be OK with this – better close it for outsiders – if we are not succeeding, then they should also not succeed...... “

I would hypothesize that if meritocratic elites learn to be less arrogant and acknowledge their loyalty towards their communities and their duty to keep  the opportunities open for all within this community  - i.e. if they start interpreting correctly the values and  principles behind liberal democracy – i.e. the principle of moral individualism -  they may be capable of surviving this crisis. And so may liberal democracy restore its credibility as the best, compared to the available alternatives, political regime. 

"Мажоритарният вот като защита на индивидуалната свобода"

Днес попаднах на следните аргументи в подкрепа на мажоритарния вот

http://libertarium.net/%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%82/

Защо според мен тези аргументи са невалидни?

Заявява се, че мажоритарният вот е

1. "Ефикасно средство за премахване на посегателствата върху индивидуалната ни свобода, изискващо персонална отговорност, за всяко придобито право. Изборите са акт, чрез който делегираме на даден политик свободата да действа от наше име и за наша сметка. Това трябва да е недвусмислено обвързано с пропорционална на тази свобода отговорност.
Подобно пропорционалност може да се получи единствено и само при мажоритарни избори." 

Какъв е аргументът тук. Той е в две стъпки:

а). само мажоритарните избори дават възможност за пропорционална на правото да ни управляват лична отговорност на представляващите ни.
б). тази лична отговорност на представителите ни дава възможност за "намаляване на степента, в която държавата се намесва в живота ни.

Дори и да приемем, че Манолов е прав за  стъпка а.), от личната отговорност на представляващите ни по никакъв начин не следва, че тази отговорност ще доведе до намаляване на намесата на държавата в живота ни - т.е.  не следва б.). Най-малкото защото не е немислимо мажоритарното избиране на кандидат-диктатор. Унгарската избирателна система с много силен мажоритарен елемент доведе точно до такъв резултат. И няма причина да мислим, че това няма как да стане при една чисто мажоритарна система, в която малък процент от населението може да избере управление с абсолютно мнозинство. 

Всъщност, г-н Манолов не е прав дори за а.) - за да е вярно твърдението за пряка връзка между лична отговорност и мажоритарен избор, трябва изобщо да се елиминира ролята на партиите в избора на мажоритарни кандидати. На мнозина у нас това изглежда добра идея. Всъщност елиминирането на партиите от процеса на номиниране на кандидати е дълбоко проблемно - замислете се каква точно е "личната" отговорност, която носи някой, зад когото не стои никоя партия или организация? И как точно държите отговорен такъв представител, ако започне да безчинства и "ограничава свободата" ни? Боя се, че гражданите по твърде болезнен начин ще научат и този урок - отговорността на индивидуални, независими кандидати не е по-голяма, а е много по-малка от тази на кандидати, подкрепени от партии. Какво можеш да направиш по отношение на индивидуален кандидат, който е злоупотребил с доверието ти? В най-добрия случай можеш да накажеш провинилия се кандидат, като не гласуваш на следващите избори за него.- но няма как да си гарантираш, че утре няма да те измамят нови "незамисими" кандидати". Обратно, ако системно те мамят кандидати на дадена партия, избирателите наказват цялата партия, като не й дават възможност да участва в управлението - и да отнема свободата им. 

2. "При пропорционалната система подредбата на листите зависи от партийния лидер. Това води до три сериозни последствия. Първо, политикът трябва да е харесван от лидера на партията, а не от избирателите, за да бъде издигната кандидатурата му. Второ, с течение на времето партиите се превръщат в лидерски. Трето, на политическата сцена се появяват повече от две партии и се размива идеологическото противопоставяне.

Тези три последствия неизбежно подкопават основите на демокрацията и тя започва да се изражда"

Вярно е, че за да бъде издигнат, един кандидат трябва да се хареса  на лидера. Но съвсем не е вярно, че в една пропорционална избирателна система той не трябва да се харесва на избирателите. Напротив –спомнете си само колко популярни лица от артистичния и спортния  свят и други  популярни обществени сфери изпълваха листите на партия именно в надежда кандидатите да се харесат на избирателите.  Партия, която не се интересува от това дали издигнатите кандидати се харесват или не на избирателите, няма шанс да победи или просперира. И това е така и в двата вида избирателни системи - няма съществена разлика тук между избирателните системи.  

Не е вярно и второто твърдение, че лидерски партии възникват само в пропорционални, и никога в мажоритарни системи. Има примери за лидерски партии и в чисто мажоритарни системи.

Третият аргумент също не издържа - понеже в пропорционалните системи навлизали много партии, това водело до размиване на идеологическото противопоставяне. Всъщност , точно обратното е вярно. Както Антъни Даунс показва в "Икономическа теория на демокрацията", мажоритарната система води до идеологическо обезличаване на двете основни партии и до събиране на позициите им в позицията на т.нар. "среден гласуващ". 

Най-неиздържано е заключението, според което пропорционалните системи водели до "израждане на демокрацията". Не знам каква е теорията за демокрация, използвана в подкрепа на тази теза, но ще посоча, че възходът на популизма, определян като една от най-големите заплахи за демокрацията днес, се случи именно в демокрации с мажоритарни избирателни системи. Мнозина политолози и анализатори твърдят, че системното изключване на UKIP от парламентарния живот в Обединеното кралствое е една от основните причини за нарастване популярността на тезите им. 

Заключението, най-неочаквано, е че "в Европейския съюз наднационалната парламентарна демокрация e подкопала свободата, независимостта и предприемачеството в страните-членки, и това неизбежно води до антагонизъм, намеса, инертност и разхищение на средства."

Авторът не ни е обяснил дали тези дефицити се дължат на пропорционалната избирателна система  или нещо друго? Не е изяснил и какво общо има ЕС с една или друга избирателна система, за да оправдае избора на избирателна система с аргументи от състоянието на ЕС. 

Може би, в заключение, следва да напомним, че в ЕС членуват страни с различни избирателни системи, и макар евродепутатите наистина да се избират с пропорционална избирателна система, важните решения за ЕС не се взимат от ЕП.  От всичко това следва, че дискусия на дефицитите на ЕС,  доколкото ги има, няма никакво отношение към аргументите в подкрепа на една или друга избирателна система на ниво национална държава. 

Populism and meritocratic elites

How to close the gap between people and elites?

Talk at the Free Market Road Show 2017, 

American University in Bulgaria, 

March 23th, Blagoevgrad 

All standard definitions of populism include:

·         - opposing people to the elites;

·         - populist politicians claiming to speak on behalf of the  people, voicing their «authentic» concerns, even anger, against the corrupt elites;

·        -  prioritizing «the sovereign» and its interests (in my mind the word that defines the current populist age) over the individual with her rights and interests.

This claim to speak on behalf of the sovereign is often translated into policies that aim to get immediate public acclaim rather than be correct (and correct policies in my mind are those that promote the public interest in the longer run).

The populist politicians are thus followers of the mood of the crowd here and now rather than leaders, people with a vision for the future and mission to bring about better future which might, however, need painful policies now. Populist politicians are rarely genuine leaders.

Democracy - with its short election cycle and the imperative to win the majority of votes, in order to get the chance to rule, seems particularly hospitable to populism and populist politicians.

The question, thus, is not why such a strong wave of populism now. Rather, it is why such a strong wave of populism only now?

Two deviations  here:

1.We should bear in mind, however, that the type of regime introduced and practiced around the globe is not simply democracy, but liberal democracy: the peculiar mix of popular rule through representation, combined with a rule of law, respect for individual right and competitive free markets. This mix of elements is neither easy nor even intuitive, but has survived and served so well to become the dominant, until recently unchallenged, type of government not just in the Western world, but around the globe.

2. Most radical types of populism do no rest calm with just speaking on behalf of the people. They come with a more radical claim – to altogether dismantle liberal democracy as being against the interests of the sovereign, as it imposes breaks on the popular will – such as individual rights and rule of law.

The question, to come back to it, is not why populism now, but why populism just now.

Many factors contribute to the rise of populism:

·         - dissatisfaction with the breaks the regime puts on the popular will: majorities feel powerless as they cannot change policies not in their control - decided by anonymous, external to them powerful others (the global markets,  the top world bankers, corporations.....);

·        -  for a long period, free trade, effective individual rights protection and liberal democracy more generally were perceived as bulwarks of peace, stability and prosperity that characterized the post WWII world. With fading of the memory of the war and the turbulence of the financial crisis and the biggest recession since WWII, skepticism towards liberal democracy grows;

·         - there is growing distrust towards the elites in these regimes – seen in surveys around the globe. Elites are distrusted as they are seen as self-interested, opportunistic uprooted cosmopolitans, who feel at home in the world rather than in their own nations, are seen as ready to betray national interests for their personal advantage, or simply leave when something more interesting comes up;…..etc.

Recently Ivan Krastev raised an intriguing further hypothesis to explain the rise of populism:  the populist backlash against the elites is closely associated with a backlash against another feature of liberal democracies and the way the elites are recruited there: egalitarian meritocracy.

Let me be clear here: Meritocracy seems the best – both ex ante (as the most fair – as all have equal opportunity to try) and ex post - producing the best results - way to recruit elites. Not inheritance but personal achievement must surely be the only ground to succeed.

Indeed, members of meritocratic elites are usually (believed to be) self-made high achievers, who through hard work (in highly selective schools, universities and beyond) successfully climbed up the social ladder. And there is nothing wrong about that – just the opposite.

The psychological profile of the meritocratic elites, however, is the interesting thing here and may bear on the recent rise of populism. The representatives of such elites are taking the full credit for their success in life - they live with the conviction that they do not owe anything to anyone, even to their compatriots. Traditional national elites, in contrast, were much more closely connected to their people, sharing (or successfully pretending to share) a common fate with them.  As meritocratic elites are denying the existence of any thicker bond to their compatriots, it is not surprising that the less successful in life common people mistrust them as not being part of them. They develop aversion towards the cosmopolitan elite, claiming it betrays their unique shared identity and even threatens their world.

Yet what people resent most seems to be the arrogance of the meritocratic elites who claim the right to rule them without sharing their fate, sharing their identity, their hopes and fears, without being part of them.

This accusation of the «arrogance» of the elites  is probably the most wide spread, rallying cry of populism. And not too rarely, we must admit, it is well deserved.

The way to bridge the gap?

The irony with populist's claim to speak on behalf of the people on the ground that they are part of them, and thus are able to voice their authentic claims, is that populists are almost always parts of the elite, and if not, soon become such (and we do not need to know the intricacies of the «iron low of oligarchy» of Roberto Michels to know this).

As the Italian elitists have taught us the simple truth is that it is always the elites that rule. But this fact, contra Michels, does not mean that democracy is impossible. Just the opposite: representative democracy is a good form of government (remember that for neither Plato nor Aristotle democracy was a good, even tolerable form of government and only since 18th century we have looked more favourably to democracy – if only under the name of «republicanism»). Democracy is a good regime precisely because it produces better results for its citizens than the alternatives. And better results need knowledge and expertise to be brought about. Meritocracy is indeed the best way to recruit elites that can produce good results. Yet the challenge for the meritocratic elites is to not succumb to the arrogance described above.

Another prominent theorist of the elites– the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (writing in 1942!) also believed that democracy, despite the fact that it was put in the defensive by authoritarian rulers, will nevertheless survive. He is best known in political theory for his «new theory of democracy», further developed by Anthony Downs and the public choice school as «the economic theory of democracy» to become a mainstream theory of democracy in contemporary political theory. Schumpeter described democracy as a market-like competition between members of the elite to get the right to rule, granted them by the citizens on the basis of the services those elites offer the citizens.

To survive, however, democracy needs responsible elites, who adhere to strict conventional codes of conduct, preventing them from developing the lethal for democracy arrogance of the elites. 

   

Защо у нас няма лидерски дебат?

Краткият отговор е пределно прост: за да има лидерски дебат, има две необходими условия за провеждането му: трябват лидери, които могат да  дебатират.  И двете условия отсъстват в момента.

Първото условие: да има лидери. Лидери, които не просто следват променливите настроения на мнозинството, а са готови да поемат отговорност и да водят избирателите, предлагайки визия за развитието на страната, конкретизирана в политики в значимите за гражданите сектори.   Председателите на двете водещи в предизборните рейтинги партии у нас биват  определяни като „лидери“ по-скоро по инерция- щом са председатели, значи са и лидери. За да бъдат лидери в съдържателния, а не чисто формален смисъл, обаче, те трябва да водят, не да следват: да дръзват да поставят неудобни теми и да предлагат дори и непопулярни решения, когато доброто на страната изисква това.  Темите, предлагани от председателите на ГЕРБ и БСП, обаче, са добре  познати и напълно предвидими. Те са по-висок растеж (тази тема измести невдъхновяващата никого стабилност), водещ до рязко нарастване на доходите, и борба с бедността. Решенията също  изненадват със своята предвидимост и стремеж да угодят максимално на „средностатистическия гласуващ“ . Така ГЕРБ се включиха в епидемично разпространилото се дори сред десни партии наддаване кой ще предложи най-висока средна пенсия и заплата, а очакването, че лявата партия ще прокарва визията си за по-голямо бюджетно преразпределение чрез замяна на плоското с прогресивно подоходно облагане също не се оправда поради  непопулярността на мярката увеличаване на данъците дори и сред левите избиратели. Флиртът с предпочитанията на средния гласовоподавател от страна и на двете големи партии води до обезличаването им по отношение конкретни политики и до търсене на възможности за различаване през символни теми, като национална идентичност -  кой е по-голям патриот/национален предател, и т.н.

Второ условие: лидерите да могат да водят дебат по предлаганата от тях визия за развитие на страната и конкретните политики по реализирането й.  И тук, обаче, лидерите не са научили още урока си: фокусът им обикновено е върху лични компромати и като цяло очерняне на противника, а не върху изясняване  собствените позиции и критика на позициите на опонента. Очернянето на опонента в предизборен дебат не е наше откритие  и, както показват множество примери от т.нар. по-напреднали демокрации, не винаги е губещ ход. Обществената му безполезност е несъмнена,  обаче: не само никой не печели от това да му бъде напомняно постоянно колко лоши са политиците и от двете страни (особено ако не му се предлага нещо по-добро като алтернатива), но и често ваденето на  компромати се оказва контрапродуктивно – вината за загубения втори президентски мандат на Петър Стоянов неслучайно се приписва на неудачния му ход да извади компромати в дебата с Богомил Бонев.   

Независимо дали нежеланието на Корнелия Нинова и Бойко Борисов да участват в лидерски дебат, зле прикрито зад претенции и контра-претенции за формАта му, се дължи на страха от трудно предвидимия му резултат, ясно е едно: най-видните ни политици са длъжници на избирателите.  Те не са готови да напуснат зоната на комфорта си, щедро предоставян от услужливи медии  и да отстояват позициите си в публичен дебат помежду си. В този смисъл е повече от похвална инициативата на 3-те национални телевизии да координират усилията си за организирането на подобен дебат.  Непровеждането му днес, предвид описаните тук дефицити,  не изглежда чак толкова лоша новина. И все пак, погледнато дългосрочно, това не е добра новина. Без да нагази във водата, човек няма как да се научи да плува. Без да влязат в  дебат  - с риска да се провалят и изтърпят последствията от това, лидерите на големите партии няма да се научат отговорно да водят избирателите.