All standard definitions of populism include:
· - opposing people to the elites;
· - populist politicians claiming to speak on behalf of
the people, voicing their «authentic» concerns,
even anger, against the corrupt elites;
· - prioritizing «the sovereign» and its interests (in my
mind the word that defines the current populist age) over the individual with
her rights and interests.
This claim to speak on behalf of the sovereign is
often translated into policies that aim to get immediate public acclaim rather
than be correct (and correct policies in my mind are those that promote the
public interest in the longer run).
The populist politicians are thus followers of the
mood of the crowd here and now rather than leaders, people with a vision for
the future and mission to bring about better future which might, however, need
painful policies now. Populist politicians are rarely genuine leaders.
Democracy - with its short election cycle and the
imperative to win the majority of votes, in order to get the chance to rule, seems
particularly hospitable to populism and populist politicians.
The question, thus, is not why such a strong wave of
populism now. Rather, it is why such a
strong wave of populism only now?
Two deviations
here:
1.We should bear in mind, however, that the type of
regime introduced and practiced around the globe is not simply democracy, but liberal
democracy: the peculiar mix of popular rule through representation, combined
with a rule of law, respect for individual right and competitive free markets.
This mix of elements is neither easy nor even intuitive, but has survived and
served so well to become the dominant, until recently unchallenged, type of
government not just in the Western world, but around the globe.
2. Most radical types of populism do no rest calm with
just speaking on behalf of the people. They come with a more radical claim – to
altogether dismantle liberal democracy as being against the interests of the
sovereign, as it imposes breaks on the popular will – such as individual rights
and rule of law.
The question, to come back to it, is not why populism
now, but why populism just now.
Many factors contribute to the rise of populism:
· - dissatisfaction with the breaks the regime puts on the
popular will: majorities feel powerless as they cannot change policies not in
their control - decided by anonymous, external to them powerful others (the
global markets, the top world bankers,
corporations.....);
· - for a long period, free trade, effective individual
rights protection and liberal democracy more generally were perceived as bulwarks
of peace, stability and prosperity that characterized the post WWII world. With
fading of the memory of the war and the turbulence of the financial crisis and
the biggest recession since WWII, skepticism towards liberal democracy grows;
· - there is growing distrust towards the elites in these regimes
– seen in surveys around the globe. Elites are distrusted as they are seen as
self-interested, opportunistic uprooted cosmopolitans, who feel at home in the
world rather than in their own nations, are seen as ready to betray national
interests for their personal advantage, or simply leave when something more
interesting comes up;…..etc.
Recently Ivan Krastev raised an intriguing
further hypothesis to explain the rise of populism: the populist backlash against the elites is
closely associated with a backlash against another feature of liberal
democracies and the way the elites are recruited there: egalitarian meritocracy.
Let me be clear here:
Meritocracy seems the best – both ex ante (as the most fair – as all have
equal opportunity to try) and ex post
- producing the best results - way to recruit elites. Not inheritance but
personal achievement must surely be the only ground to succeed.
Indeed, members of
meritocratic elites are usually (believed to be) self-made high achievers, who
through hard work (in highly selective schools, universities and beyond)
successfully climbed up the social ladder. And there is nothing wrong about
that – just the opposite.
The psychological
profile of the meritocratic elites, however, is the interesting thing here and
may bear on the recent rise of populism. The representatives of such elites are
taking the full credit for their success in life - they live with the
conviction that they do not owe anything to anyone, even to their compatriots.
Traditional national elites, in contrast, were much more closely connected to
their people, sharing (or successfully pretending to share) a common fate with
them. As meritocratic elites are denying
the existence of any thicker bond to their compatriots, it is not surprising
that the less successful in life common people mistrust them as not being part
of them. They develop aversion towards the cosmopolitan elite, claiming it
betrays their unique shared identity and even threatens their world.
Yet what people
resent most seems to be the arrogance of the meritocratic elites who claim the right to rule
them without sharing their fate, sharing their identity, their hopes and fears,
without being part of them.
This accusation of
the «arrogance» of the elites is
probably the most wide spread, rallying cry of populism. And not too rarely, we
must admit, it is well deserved.
The way to bridge the
gap?
The irony with
populist's claim to speak on behalf of the people on the ground that they are part
of them, and thus are able to voice their authentic claims, is that populists
are almost always parts of the elite, and if not, soon become such (and we do
not need to know the intricacies of the «iron low of oligarchy» of Roberto
Michels to know this).
As the Italian
elitists have taught us the simple truth is that it is always the elites that
rule. But this fact, contra Michels, does not mean that democracy is
impossible. Just the opposite: representative democracy is a good form of
government (remember that for neither Plato nor Aristotle democracy was a good,
even tolerable form of government and only since 18th century we have looked
more favourably to democracy – if only under the name of «republicanism»). Democracy
is a good regime precisely because it produces better results for its citizens
than the alternatives. And better results need knowledge and expertise to be
brought about. Meritocracy is indeed the best way to recruit elites that can produce
good results. Yet the challenge for the meritocratic elites is to not succumb
to the arrogance described above.
Another prominent
theorist of the elites– the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (writing in 1942!) also believed that democracy,
despite the fact that it was put in the defensive by authoritarian rulers, will
nevertheless survive. He is best known in political theory for his «new theory
of democracy», further developed by Anthony Downs and the public choice school as
«the economic theory of democracy» to become a mainstream theory of democracy
in contemporary political theory. Schumpeter described democracy as a
market-like competition between members of the elite to get the right to rule,
granted them by the citizens on the basis of the services those elites offer
the citizens.
To survive, however,
democracy needs responsible elites, who adhere to strict conventional codes of
conduct, preventing them from developing the lethal for democracy arrogance of
the elites.
